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SPIRITUALITY, FUNDAMENTALISM, LIBERTY:
RELIGION AT THE END OF MODERNITY
Frederick Mark Gedicks*
And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us.
-John 1:14
INTRODUCTION
Our world has fallen apart. Not literally, of course, but metaphysi-
cally. We no longer possess an understanding of the place and pur-
pose of humanity that would infuse every life with the same ultimate
meaning. References to this metaphysical crisis appear throughout
the arts and humanities. We are described as living "at the end of an
age,"' and in the "twilight of Being,' '2 struggling through an "after-
math of confusion and helplessness."'3 Ours is a time of "slackening,"
a "splintering of culture" and a "shattering of belief, ' 4 marked by
"pastiche," "dissonance," and "atonal experiment."' 5 Our existence is
"unbearably light," 6 our thought is "weak," 7 and even the "real"
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; e-
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1. See JOHN LuKAcs, AT THE END OF AN AGE (2002).
2. GIANNi VATTIMO, AFTER CHRISTIANITY 77 (Luca D'Isanto trans., 2002).
3. HANNAH ARENDT, Tradition and the Modern Age, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 17, 18
(1968).
4. Jean-Franqois Lyotard, Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism? (Rdgis Durand
trans., 1982) [hereinafter Lyotard, What Is Postmodernism?], reprinted in JEAN-FRAN(;OIS LY-
OTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE app. 1, at 71, 72, 77 (Geoff
Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979) [hereinafter LYOTARD,
THE POSTMODERN CONDITION].
5. Martin E. Marty, The Widening Gyres of Religion and Law, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 654
(1996).




world lacks reality.8 "[T]he epoch in which we live today," writes Gi-
anni Vattimo, "is the epoch in which reality can no longer be con-
ceived of as a structure solidly tied to a sole foundation that
philosophy would have the task of knowing, or... that religion would
have the task of adoring."9 Our world has become postmodern.
Now, "postmodern" is a troubled word; indeed, some would say, a
troubled word for a troubled and troubling idea. It is perhaps fitting
that the meaning of "postmodern" should be imprecise and highly
contested. Like some other adjectives-"feminist" and "liberal"
come to mind-"postmodern" generates strong, visceral feelings in
most who hear it. It can stand in for whatever one likes or dislikes
about the world, for everything and nothing. In the aftermath of 9/11,
for example, postmodernism was simultaneously criticized as unable
to provide an ethical perspective adequate to permit condemnation of
the terrorist attacks, and defended as providing the only plausible ba-
sis for such condemnation. 10
Jean-Franqois Lyotard is often credited-or blamed-for releasing
the term "postmodern" from the confines of art and architecture into
philosophy and the humanities.1' With an admittedly "extreme sim-
plification," Lyotard defined "postmodern" as "incredulity towards
metanarratives"12-that is, general accounts of human nature and his-
tory that purport to be independent of time, place, culture, and other
contextual influences, and that determine how knowledge and truth
7. Gianni Vattimo, Dialettica, Differenza, Pensiero Debole, in IL PENSIERO DEBOLE 12 (Gi-
anni Vattimo & Pier Aldo Rovatti eds., 1983), translated as Gianni Vattimo, Dialectics, Differ-
ence, Weak Thought, in Weak Thought 10 (Gianni Vattimo & Pier Aldo Rovatti eds., 2004)
(trans. copyright Peter Carravetta 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the DePaul Law
Review).
8. Lyotard, What Is Postmodernism?, supra note 4, at 77.
9. VATTIMO, supra note 2, at 5; see also GIANNI VATTIMO, BELIEF 82 (Luca D'Isanto & David
Webb trans., 1999) ("The objective world order has fallen to pieces.").
10. See generally, e.g., Steven Mailloux, Contingent Universals: Religious Fundamentalism, Ac-
ademic Postmodernism, and Public Intellectuals in the Aftermath of September 11, 24 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1583 (2003); Stanley Fish, Postmodern Warfare, HARPERS MAG., July 2002, at 33.
11. See LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, supra note 4. The Oxford English Diction-
ary (OED) places the first published use of "post-modern" in 1949, in an architectural context.
Until 1980, most of the exemplary usages listed by the OED are architectural or artistic, and
"postmodern" retains a meaning in those disciplines which is distinct from the meaning later
given the term by the humanities. See IX THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 201 (2d ed. 1989).
The Postmodern Condition was published in French in 1979, and in English in 1984. See LY.
OTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, supra note 4.
12. LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, supra note 4, at xxiv (emphasis added); see also
id. at xxiii (giving as examples of metanarratives the "dialectics of the Spirit," the "hermeneutics
of meaning," the "emancipation of the rational or working subject," and the "creation of
wealth").
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are constituted.13 I intend a similarly modest and oversimplified
meaning. The advent of postmodernism marks the end of modernity,
and a break with the universal myth of Enlightenment. Postmodernity
recreates the cultural space for religion that was appropriated by En-
lightenment modernism. The religion that properly and plausibly oc-
cupies this space, however, is radically different from the religion that
modernism superseded.
"Enlightenment" was an optimistic attitude that expected reason
and science to reveal the world "as it really is," and anticipated that
humanity could ultimately control that world. 14 The knowledge
spawned by Enlightenment would render the world predictable, while
the technology enabled by Enlightenment knowledge would render
the world controllable. With Enlightenment, it was anticipated that
floods and fires, famine and drought, accident and disease, violence
and war, would all be mitigated, diminished, and eventually elimi-
nated by the forward march of scientific rationalism.
This Enlightenment idea, that the human race could progressively
overcome the world, was not limited to physics and biology. By the
nineteenth century, Enlightenment had migrated to the human or so-
cial sciences, promising human control of society as well as nature.
15
In the nineteenth century, wrote Maurice Merleau-Ponty, science
"was getting ready to dominate existence, theoretically and practically.
Whether it was a question of technical or political action, men thought
they would soon have access to the laws according to which nature
and society are constructed, and govern both according to their princi-
ples."1 6 Law and the humanities developed "sciences of interpreta-
tion," which proposed to transform the process of ascertaining textual
13. See Fish, supra note 10, at 33, 34 (challenging the conception of objectively valid truth that
presupposes a "standard of validity and value that is independent of any historically emergent
and therefore revisable system of thought and practice," and that enables moral condemnation
"rooted in values, priorities, and a sense of right and wrong that no one would dispute and
everyone accepts"); see also LurAcs, supra note 1, at 40 ("[B]ehind the employment of the 'post-
modern' category we can detect the uneasy and long overdue recognition that such fixed catego-
ries as Objectivism, Scientism, Realism, Naturalism are now pass6."); Ashley Woodward, Nihil-
ism and the Postmodern in Vattimo's Nietzsche, 6 MINERVA: AN INTERNET J. PHIL. 51, 57 (2002),
at http://www.ul.ie/-philos ("Postmodernity is generally thought to be characterized by the frag-
mentation of society into multiple, incommensurable forms of life," none of which "can explain
social reality as a whole.").
14. See, e.g., Stanley Rosen, Rethinking the Enlightenment, COMMON KNOWLEDGE, Winter
1998, at 104, 105, 107-08.
15. See generally L.L. & J.S. Bernard, A Century of Progress in the Social Sciences, 11 Soc.
FORCES 488 (1933) (relating how the influence of scientific method transformed law and history
and spawned entirely new disciplines like sociology, economics, and political science).
16. MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, Einstein and the Crisis of Reason, in SIGNS 192, 192 (Richard
C. McCleary trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1964) (1960).
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meaning from a quality of professional or aesthetic judgment into a
more stable and systematic procedure. 17 History became objective. 18
Psychology opened the human mind to our rational interpretation.1 9
Economics promised to end the cycles of financial panic and depres-
sion with fiscal, monetary, and trade policy that could "fine-tune" the
economy.20 It seemed that there was virtually nothing in our world
that could not be manipulated and controlled with a grounding in rea-
son and science. 21
More than a historical era, "Enlightenment" was an attitude-the
attitude of the modern.22 The Oxford English Dictionary defines
"modernity" as "[a]n intellectual tendency or social perspective char-
acterized by departure from or repudiation of traditional ideas, doc-
trines, and cultural values in favour of contemporary or radical values
(chiefly those of scientific rationalism and liberalism). 23 Historically,
the Enlightenment was a break with medieval Christianity-or, more
precisely, a break with the preeminence of the medieval church as ar-
biter of truth and knowledge. 24 "At the core of the classical Enlight-
enment was a sense," writes Steven Smith,
that the scholastic philosophy and religious culture inherited from
the Middle Ages and the more unsettled intellectual culture of early
modernity were not based on or oriented to truth. So eighteenth-
17. See, e.g., EMILIO BETI- TEORIA GENERALE DELLA INTERPRETAZIONE (A. Giuffr ed.,
1955); FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (3d ed. 1880). For an account
of this development, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Conservatives, Liberals, Romantics: The Per-
sistent Quest for Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 613, 621-25 (1997).
18. See ERNST BREISACH, ON THE FUTURE OF HISTORY 119 (2003).
Two pillars upheld the traditional theory of truth: evidence and objectivity. The one
delivered the crucial link to the past as once lived. The other aimed at negating the
influence of life's context on the historian. Together they held out the possibility of at
least an approximation to a true account.
Id.
19. See generally, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, in THE
BASIC WRITINGS OF SIGMUND FREUD 933 (A.A. Brill trans. & ed., 1938).
20. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST,
AND MONEY (1936).
21. See VATIMO, supra note 2, at 75 ("[W]hat are Europe, the West, or modernity, if not
above all the civilization of scientific, economic, and technological rationality?").
22. See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 13, at 57 ("Modernity is typified by the setting into prac-
tice of the values of the Enlightenment project.").
23. OED ONLINE, at http://dictionary.oed.comlcgi/entry/00313111?single=l&query-type=
word&queryword=modernity&edition=3e&first=l&max to show=10 (last visited May 11,
2005); see also IX THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 948 (defining modern-
ism as "[a] tendency or movement towards modifying traditional beliefs and doctrines in accor-
dance with the findings of modern criticism and research; esp. a movement of this kind in the
Roman Catholic Church at the beginning of the twentieth century").
24. See BRIAN D. INGRAFFIA, POSTMODERN THEORY AND BIBLICAL THEOLOGY 2-3 (1995).
1200 [Vol. 54:1197
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century thinkers "made a great point of having renounced the su-
perstition and hocus-pocus of medieval Christian thought."
25
Thus, Kant described Enlightenment as emergence from an intellec-
tual immaturity that renders one unable to exercise one's own judg-
ment without guidance from someone else. 26 More recently, Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, echoing Max Weber,27 character-
ized Enlightenment as the "disenchantment of the world," the "disso-
lution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy."
28
Although initially Enlightenment may have challenged only a cer-
tain kind of Christian thought,2 9 it eventually came to signify a secular
25. Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1263, 1270
(2004) (quoting CARL BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSO-
PHERS 29 (1932)).
26. IMMANUEL KANT, What Is Enlightenment?, in PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 263, 263 (Ernst
Behler ed., 1986).
27. See MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
129, 155 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) [hereinafter FROM MAX WEBER]
(positing that "[t]he fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization
and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'").
28. MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 3 (John Cum-
ming trans., 1972).
29. See Smith, supra note 25. Smith draws a distinction between two historical modes of En-
lightenment thought. The earlier "classical Enlightenment," he argues, was generally committed
to the idea that there exists a normative cosmic order whose essential character is discoverable
and comprehensible by human beings properly trained in the exercise of reason:
If a proposition is true, it was supposed, then through reason all competent and honest
people should in principle be able to apprehend its truth. And a moral or political
proposition could be true, or false, because there was thought to be a Truth, or a "Na-
ture," that the proposition could correctly or incorrectly represent-in the same way
that a proposition in physics or chemistry (about the movement of particles, or about
cold fusion) can be true or false because there is a material reality that the proposition
may or may not represent correctly.
See id. at 1295. The more contemporary "modern Enlightenment," by contrast, denies either
that such an order exists, or that its essential character is accessible to human beings (or both).
See id. at 1282, 1296 (observing that in contemporary Western culture, and particularly in the
academy, "the belief in a divinely-established normative order, widely shared in the eighteenth
century, has by now come to seem at best highly sectarian," and that unlike classical Enlighten-
ment thinkers, "contemporary theorists describe the value of consensus not in terms of a test of
truth, but rather in terms of political and social values such as fairness, civility, and coopera-
tion"). Modern Enlightenment, according to Smith, almost perfectly inverts the ideas of classical
Enlightenment:
Imposing labels anachronistically, we may today suppose that because the Enlighten-
ment was supposed to have been a secular movement rebelling against a tradition that
was religious, Enlightenment thinkers must have repudiated this belief in a providential
order. But this supposition turns history on its head. Not only did the classical Enlight-
enment retain a faith in the existence of a normative cosmic order; the accomplishment
of thinkers like Locke . . . was precisely to subvert religious doctrines, such as the
Calvinist doctrine of depravity, that had undermined confidence in the capacity of
human beings to comprehend and conform to that overarching order.
See id. at 1275-76 (citation omitted). Similarly, George Marsden argues that the most influential
modes of Enlightenment in the United States were the early "Moderate Enlightenment," typi-
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challenge to all of Christianity and, indeed, all religion.30 As an atti-
tude, Enlightenment is liberation, freedom from beliefs about the
world that are grounded in nothing more than authority, tradition, or
scripture-beliefs, in other words, whose truth or accuracy cannot be
rationally or scientifically demonstrated. 31
When Enlightenment displaced Christianity-when modernity dis-
placed belief-religion was forced to a Hobson's choice. Theology
could either adapt itself to modernity, by discarding the doctrines and
beliefs which modernity had discredited, or it could reject modernity
outright and migrate to the margins of public life, there to survive as
the remnant of an irrelevant and discredited world view. 32 For exam-
ple, theological liberals in late-nineteenth century America sought to
rescue evangelical Protestantism from the challenges of modernist
thinking by abandoning literal-historical interpretations of the Bible
in favor of metaphorical and figurative readings.33 Conservatives, on
fied by Newton and Locke, and the "Didactic Enlightenment," typified by Adam Smith, both of
which sought to reconcile belief with the emerging scientific order; by contrast, the "Skeptical
Enlightenment" of Voltaire and Hume, which generally rejected religion in favor of scientific
rationalism, was "discredited in many influential circles when [it] became associated with the
French Revolution." See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDAMENTALISM AND Ev-
ANGELICALISM 128-29 (1991).
30. See, e.g., KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE BATTLE FOR GOD 199 (2000) ("The astonishing
achievements of scientific rationalism had made the very idea of God incredible and impossible
for many Westernized people, since it had gone hand-in-hand with a suppression of the old
mythical consciousness."); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 271-72 (Joel Wein-
sheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1992) ("Enlightenment critique is primarily
directed against the religious tradition of Christianity-i.e., the Bible."); IV MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER, NIETZSCHE: NIHILISM 99 (David Farrell Krell ed., Frank A. Capuzzi trans., 1982) ("Since
the beginning of and throughout the modern age [Christianity] has continued to be that against
which the new freedom-whether expressly or not-must be distinguished.").
31. See, e.g., ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 168-70 (1951) (ar-
guing that, from the point of view of Enlightenment, the enemies of knowledge and faith were
not skepticism and doubt, but the dogma and superstition of the church); GADAMER, supra note
30, at 272.
[Iln general, the Enlightenment tends to accept no authority and to decide everything
before the judgment seat of reason. Thus the written tradition of Scripture, like any
other historical document, can claim no absolute validity; the possible truth of the tradi-
tion depends on the credibility that reason accords it. It is not tradition but reason that
constitutes the ultimate source of all authority.
Id.; see also Rosen, supra note 14, at 105, 114 (attributing to the "Enlightenment in general the
intention to substitute the paradigm of reason for that of faith, custom, or tradition," and using
the term "Enlightenment" to "express all attempts, ancient or modern, to free the human race
from tradition, custom, religion, and metaphysics, wherever these interfere with the accurate
perception of the truth").
32. See MAX WEBER, The Social Psychology of the World Religions, in FROM MAX WEBER,
supra note 27, at 267, 281-82.
33. MARSDEN, supra note 29, at 32-36; see also Robert D. Linder, Changes in the Evangelical
Protestant Understanding of Church and State During the Twentieth Century 5 (2000) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the DePaul Law Review) ("Protestantism fragmented theologi-
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the other hand, reacted to modernism by using government and law to
defend the traditional understanding of the truth where they exercised
political control, and by withdrawing from public life where they did
not.
34
Both were losing strategies. Theological incorporation of moder-
nity pushed one down the slippery slope of belief in a "God of the
gaps," an understanding of the relationship of religion and science
that gave religion leave to explain only what science could not.35 As
science purported to explain more and more, religion was left with
less and less, until at the bottom of this hill one could see the place
where God might exist, but has nothing to do.36 On the other hand,
the choice of exile to private life would leave politics, government,
education, and other aspects of public life in the hands of unbelief,
touched by only a veneer of religious influence. Religious groups and
individuals might speak and otherwise participate in public life, but
only on condition that they cabined their religiosity. Religion might
venture back from the margins, in other words, only so long as it
dressed up-or down-in rationality.
37
Now we find that the Enlightenment that displaced Christianity, the
attitude of modernity that displaced the attitude of belief, has itself
been displaced. It is not that reason and science did not work; to the
contrary, the last three centuries have seen an unprecedented increase
in the world's store of learning and our quality of life, and a remarka-
ble technological enhancement of our ability to access that learning
and enjoy that life. It is remarkably safe and inexpensive to travel,
cally in the century following 1850, under the hammer blows of Enlightenment rationalism and
the theological liberalism it spawned."). A similar shift occurred among European theologians
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See generally, e.g., HANS FREI, THE ECLIPSE OF
BIBLICAL NARRATIVE: A STUDY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY HERMENEUTICS (1974) (describing
how the European understanding of the Bible was transformed by modernity from the sole ac-
count of literal-historical events, to one of several reliable accounts of literal-historical events, to
a mere expression of ancient cultural beliefs and practices with little connection to literal-histori-
cal events).
34. See MARSDEN, supra note 29, at 67.
35. See C.A. COULSON, SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF 19 (1955) ("It has always been one
of our major temptations to try to divide our experience into two (or more) parts and grant
science control of the one part, while allowing religion to maintain its authority in the other.").
36. See id. at 20 ("There is no 'God of the gaps' to take over at those strategic places where
science fails; and the reason is that gaps of this sort have the unpreventable habit of shrinking.").
37. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 25, at 1298 (arguing that Rawls's concession that citizens may
properly make religious arguments in public life-so long as such arguments are eventually sup-
ported by "public reason"-amounts to "telling citizens that on the most important public issues
it is permissible to express views about religion, or Truth, only on the condition that the final
decision does not depend on those views").
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even after 9/11.38 The telecommunications revolution has brought
knowledge about anything and everything literally to our fingertips.
Free market capitalism and liberal democracy-perhaps the crowning
achievements of Enlightenment in the West-have created
unimagined prosperity and freedom.
Nevertheless, it remains that Enlightenment has failed its promise.
After centuries of science, we still do not control our world. Science
and technology have generated more-and more dangerous-
problems than the ones they purported to solve. Industrialization
brought us more and cheaper goods and services, but also exploitation
of labor-including the exploitation of women and children-and the
destructive threats to self, family, and community that seem always to
accompany it.39 Economic policy moderated the business cycle, but
not the devastation of financial loss; in place of bank failures and price
collapses, ordinary people now see their jobs and savings erased by
fraud, speculation, mergers, and outsourcing. 40 Atomic research en-
ded World War II and harnessed a source of potentially unlimited en-
ergy, but in the shadow of mass human and environmental
destruction.41 Slavery is formally outlawed throughout the world, yet
38. See Paul Burnham Finney, Fear of Flying? Think Again. It's Gotten Safer., N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2004, at C8; Gene Sloan, The World Is Looking Wide Open, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2005,
at ID.
39. See, e.g., UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Bantam Classic ed. 1981) (1905) (describing bru-
tal worker conditions in the Chicago meatpacking industry during the early 1920s); David Bar-
stow & Lowell Bergman, A Workplace in Turmoil: At a Texas Foundry, An Indifference to Life,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at Al; David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, A Secretive Dynasty: A
Family's Fortune, A Legacy of Blood and Tears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at Al; David Barstow
& Lowell Bergman, Failures of Regulation: Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2003, at Al. These New York Times articles by Barstow and Bergman were part of an
investigative series, entitled Dangerous Business, that detailed how foundry and pipe-fitting
company McWane, Inc. intentionally violates worker health, safety, compensation, and environ-
mental laws and regulations without significant criminal and regulatory penalties despite an ex-
traordinary rate of employee injury and numerous employee deaths.
40. See, e.g., JUSTIN O'BRIEN, WALL STREET ON TRIAL: A CORRUPTED STATE? (2003) (relat-
ing how deregulation of securities markets and financial services facilitated the commission of
fraud by public companies and investment banks resulting in tens of billions of dollars of public
investor losses); Andrew Pollack, Medical Firms Join the Trend to Outsourcing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
24, 2005, at Al (reporting the export of medical technology jobs from the United States to India
and China); Ben White & Carrie Johnson, Investor Paybacks Small and Slow: Distributing
Money to Compensate Burned Buyers Requires Complex Calculations, WASH. POST, May 15,
2004, at El (reporting on the delays and difficulties involved in distributing to defrauded inves-
tors funds generated by settlement of civil fraud actions against public companies and invest-
ment banking firms). See generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
(Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
41. See, e.g., MICHELE STENEHJEM GERBER, ON THE HOME FRONT: THE COLD WAR LEGACY
OF THE HANFORD NUCLEAR SITE (2d ed. 2002) (documenting the disastrous environmental ef-
fects of the military's weapons-grade plutonium production at Hanford, Washington); ADRIANA
PETRYNA, LIFE EXPOSED: BIOLOGICAL CITIZENS AFTER CHERNOBYL (2002) (analyzing the dev-
1204 [Vol. 54:1197
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trafficking in human beings continues-and again, especially traffick-
ing in women and children.42 The telecommunications revolution has
indeed brought the world to our doorstep, including fraud and filth
that threaten our peace and privacy. 43 Though we may retain a faith
in the Enlightenment "project"-the use of reason, science, and tech-
nology to eliminate or ameliorate the world's problems-we nonethe-
less have a more chastened and modest appraisal of what reason,
science, and technology might realistically be expected to accomplish.
Postmodernity is the end of Enlightenment. It is the end of moder-
nity's promise of an objective understanding of the world that would
enable our control of it. History and the social sciences have laid
aside their pretense to objectivity and universality. 44 It is now an old
joke that if you "torture statistics long enough. . . they will confess to
anything. ' 45 Even the physical sciences-once known as the "hard
sciences" because of the apparent stability of their objects of study-
are now conceded to be influenced to some extent by human dis-
course, and not solely by the objective properties of the things scien-
tists investigate.46 Werner Heisenberg, for example, maintained that
"[n]atural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is a
astating political, scientific, and social consequences of the nuclear reactor explosion in
Chernobyl, Ukarine in 1986); ERNEST STERNGLASS, SECRET FALLOUT: Low-LEVEL RADIATION
FROM HIROSHIMA TO THREE-MILE ISLAND (1981) (documenting health consequences of expo-
sure to low-level radiation caused by atomic weapons, atomic tests, and nuclear-powered
reactors).
42. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Cambodia, Where Sex Traffickers Are King, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2005, at A15 (describing the sexual trafficking of Cambodian girls); Norimitsu Onishi, Japan,
Easygoing Till Now, Plans Sex Traffic Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at A3 (reporting
on the sexual trafficking of Chinese, Columbian, Filipino, and Thai women in Japan); Michael
Powell, Child Porn Operation Busted, FBI Says; Web Sites Based in Belarus, Latvia, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 2004, at A3 (describing the sexual exploitation of children to create child pornography).
43. Brian Krebs, Despite Efforts to Contain Them, "Phishing" Scams Spread, WASH. POST,
Jan. 19, 2005, at E5 (describing the proliferation of fraudulent e-mail solicitations designed to
obtain credit card numbers, to charge purchases thereon, and to convert such charges into cash);
Powell, supra note 42 (reporting the breakup of a child pornography ring which generated
270,000 Internet credit card transactions (100,000 originating in the United States) for child por-
nography sold on the World Wide Web).
44. See generally, e.g., BREISACH, supra note 18; GEORG G. IGGERS, HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1997); PETER NOVICK ET AL., THAT NOBLE DREAM (1988).
45. See, e.g., Gregg Easterbrook, Easterblogg, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Apr. 13, 2004), at
www.tnr.com/easterbrook.mhtml?pid=155
4 (last visited Oct. 11, 2004); see also The Quote Gar-
den, at http://www.quotegarden.com/statistics.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) ("There are three
kinds of lies-lies, damned lies, and statistics.") (dubiously attributed to Benjamin Disraeli by
Mark Twain).
46. See generally, e.g., ROBERT P. CREASE, THE PLAY OF NATURE (1993); HANS GEORG
GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 1981); THOMAS
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); see also MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER, BASIC QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY 48-49 (Richard Rojcewisz & Andr6 Schuwer trans.,
1994) (1984).
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part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature
as exposed to our method of questioning. '47
In short, postmodernism is a decisive rejection of modernity's myth
of progress, breakthrough, and renewal. 48 Postmodernism suggests,
instead, a "disenchantment that is final," 49 and further "a radical dis-
enchantment with the idea of disenchantment itself," which recognizes
"that even the ideal of the elimination of myth is a myth. '50
The displacement of modernity by postmodernity has been an am-
biguous blessing for religion. To be sure, it has reopened space for
religious belief that previously had been almost entirely and aggres-
sively filled by reason and science. Religion need no longer confine
itself to the gaps in our knowledge that reason and science cannot fill,
because many of their purportedly universal explanations turn out to
be local.51 Nor must religion live at the margins of public life as the
vestige of a world view rejected by scientific rationalism, because the
displacement of Enlightenment necessarily entails the displacement of
reason and science as privileged arbiters of truth and knowledge.52
"[N]ot everything in reality," wrote Paul Tillich, "can be grasped by
the language which is most adequate for mathematical sciences." 53 In
short, one can once again speak in polite society of belief as a way of
knowing and a guide for how to live.54
A historical reflection on the foundations of modem natural science will perceive that
the much-acclaimed facts, which modern experimental science accepts as the sole real-
ity, become visible as facts and can be founded only in light of a wholly determined
metaphysics of nature, a metaphysics that is not less operative because contemporary
scientists are no longer acquainted with it.... [Tihe most acute crisis of today's science
might consist precisely in having no suspicion of the crisis in which it is involved ....
Id. As Heidegger intimates, scientists themselves, as opposed to philosophers and historians of
science, still generally adhere to a modernist conception of their activities. See, e.g., STEVEN
WEINBERG, FACING Up (2001).
47. WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY 81 (1958).
48. See, e.g., ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at 367 ("At the end of the twentieth century, the
liberal myth that humanity is progressing to an ever more enlightened and tolerant state looks as
fantastic as any of the other millenian myths.").
49. Geoffrey Hartman, Transparency Reconsidered: On Postmodernism, Fundamentalism, and
Other Dark Matters, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1569 (2003) (arguing that "'Postmodern' ...
suggests a disenchantment that is final. The period concept of modernity as breakthrough and
decisive renewal seems to have lured us once too often.").
50. VA-TIMO, supra note 9, at 29.
51. Id. ("The untenability of scientistic and historicist rationalism-both of which repudiated
the very possibility of religion-has been widely accepted as a given in our culture."); id. at 67
("[H]aving left behind the metaphysical claim to objectivity, today none should be able to say,
'God does not exist."').
52. For development of this argument, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility
to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992).
53. PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 54 (Robert Kimball ed., 1978).
54. See VATTIMO, supra note 9, at 28.
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Ideas regularly reappear in the cycles of history, but they are rarely
the same the second time around. Resurrection is not total, renewal
rarely full, and restoration almost never complete. Both Christianity
and Enlightenment, belief and modernity, are grand universal ac-
counts-"metanarratives," to use Lyotard's term55-that "claimed to
grasp the true structure of reality, the laws of history, and the method
for acquiring knowledge about the only 'truth." 56 Though it is the
failure of modernity that has brought us to postmodernity, postmoder-
nity rejects all universal narratives, not just those of modernity. The
displacement of Christianity by Enlightenment was the substitution of
one universal narrative for another; postmodernism, however, not
only offers no new universal narrative in place of modernity, it also
denies the possibility of any such narrative-that is, it denies the pos-
sibility of any universally accepted and acceptable account of the
world and humanity's place in it.57
The irony of religion in a postmodern age is that postmodernism
opens the space for radical religious pluralism by denying the possibil-
ity of metanarratives, while each religion from its own particular per-
spective may understand its beliefs as the metanarrative that properly
applies to the entire world. As Vattimo describes the problem, the
"return of religion seems .. .to depend on the dissolution of meta-
physics," that is, on the rejection of all doctrines which claim to render
a true and singular description of reality.5 8 Yet, "the renewal of relig-
55. See supra text accompanying note 12. Of course, even during their metanarrative heydays,
Christianity and Enlightenment were only thought "universal" from the perspective of the West.
56. VAarIMo, supra note 2, at 86.
57. Following Heidegger, Vattimo argues that this is the meaning of Nietzsche's declaration of
the death of God. According to Vattimo, "God is dead" does not signify an assertion that there
is no God, but rather that there exists no metaphysical foundation that enables the objective
demonstration of the essential nature of truth or reality:
"God is dead" means nothing else than the fact that there is no ultimate foundation.
An analogous meaning, albeit unacknowledged, is found in Heidegger's polemics
against metaphysics-the whole European philosophical tradition from Parmenides
on-which believes itself capable of grasping the ultimate foundation of reality in the
form of an objective structure like an essence or a mathematical truth, which is given
outside of time.
VAYFIMO, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE §§ 108, 125,
at 167, 181 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974)); see also Vattimo, Weak Thought, supra note 7, at 15.
This relation of overcoming and distortion [in metaphysics] is already exemplified in
Nietzsche's announcement that God is dead, which is not a metaphysical utterance on
the nonexistence of God. The statement is intended to take active account of an event,
... since the death of God means mainly the end of the stable structure of being, hence
also the end of the possibility of pronouncing God's existence or nonexistence.
Id. Although Vattimo's reading of Heidegger is uncontroversial, it is not clear that Heidegger's
reading of Nietzsche is. See, e.g., INGRAFFIA, supra note 24, at 24-32 (disputing the Heidegger-
ian reading).
58. VATrIMO, supra note 2, at 18-19.
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ion configures itself necessarily as the claim to an ultimate truth,"
which challenges the very plurality of world views that is brought into
being by the dissolution of metaphysics.59
The "religion" that can properly return at the end of modernity,
then, is not the religion inscribed in the Christian narrative of
premodernity, and thus does not really "return" at all. The religion
displaced by Enlightenment was a totalizing metanarrative, the unity
of society under the umbrella of the one true Christian church. 60 To-
day, we would call such religion "fundamentalist," based on its self-
confident certainty that its knowledge of the Truth justifies the use of
government power to persuade all people to submit to it.61
Postmodernism's rejection of all such accounts, however, means that
religion may return from the margins, but only as a partial, local, and
unprivileged account of our place in the world, rather than the one
true account of that place. This understanding of religion resonates
with what contemporary sociologists call "spirituality," an increasingly
common attitude of self-discovery through which one gives meaning
to life by adopting only those religious images and interpretations that
seem relevant and important to that individual.62 Religion finds itself
the object of renewal and rediscovery at the end of modernity, but
only because postmodernism has dethroned Enlightenment, along
with all other metanarratives.
How, then, is "religion" constituted in American constitutional law
at the end of our age, the end of modernity? The development of the
doctrine of religious liberty through American constitutional history
mirrors the displacement of belief by modernity, and modernity by
post-modernity. 63 The two competing conceptions of belief, spiritual-
ity and fundamentalism, are now vying for the space that formerly was
the exclusive domain of reason and science. 64 Although for now the
constitutional understanding of religious liberty is organized around
this relationship, 65 this dialectic is not stable because spirituality, not
fundamentalism, is the mode of religion better suited for our times.66
59. Id. at 19.
60. See 1 ERNST TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 246-56
(Olive Wyon trans., 1976) (1911) (arguing that fortuitous social, economic, and political condi-
tions enabled a "Christian unity of civilization" during the Middle Ages).
61. See infra Part III.B.
62. See infra Part III.A.
63. See infra Part II.
64. See infra Part III.
65. See infra Part IV.
66. See infra Parts V, VI.
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II. RELIGION CLAUSE HISTORY
The earliest interpretations of the Religion Clauses by the Supreme
Court came in the Mormon Polygamy Cases of the late nineteenth
century, in which the Court repeatedly upheld anti-bigamy laws, both
on their face and as applied to members of The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, who were obeying what they believed was a di-
vine commandment. 67 Not generally viewed as among the Court's fin-
est moments, the Mormon Polygamy Cases are nevertheless consistent
with both the historical understanding of the Free Exercise Clause,
68
and contemporary doctrine developed by the Supreme Court,
69
neither of which supports a reading of the Free Exercise Clause that
requires believers to be relieved of incidental burdens on their beliefs
and practices. There was an interlude in the late twentieth century
during which the Court held that religious individuals and groups
were indeed constitutionally entitled to be excused from obeying laws
that burdened their religious beliefs or interfered with their religious
practices,70 but the Court abandoned this "religious exemption" doc-
67. Late Corp. of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
68. Phillip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Per-
spective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992) (arguing that during the late eighteenth century,
Americans did not understand the Free Exercise Clause to require that believers be exempted
from laws that burden their religious beliefs or practices); Marci A. Hamilton, Religion, The Rule
of Law, and the Good of the Whole: A View from the Clergy, 18 J.L. & POL. 387 (2002) (arguing
that American Protestant clergy during the late eighteenth century believed that the common
good required that religious beliefs and practices conform to properly enacted law). Judge Mc-
Connell has provided the most detailed account of the historical basis for religious exemptions,
but even he concluded that constitutionally compelled exemptions for believers were only one of
several plausible interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause. See Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409
(1990); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537-38 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that the "extravagant" claim that Smith's rejection of constitutionally compelled ex-
emptions is historically unfounded is contradicted by McConnell's conclusion that constitution-
ally compelled exemptions from generally applicable laws were merely "'within the
contemplation of the framers and ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the free exercise clause"'
(alteration in original) (quoting McConnell, supra, at 1415)).
69. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-80, 882, 884-85 (1990).
70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (excusing the Amish from a state compulsory
school attendance law); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (ordering the state to pay unem-
ployment compensation to a Seventh-Day Adventist who by state law had been rendered ineligi-
ble for unemployment compensation because she had refused to take a job that would have
required her to work on Saturdays (the Seventh-Day Adventists' Sabbath)). Even during the
reign of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine, the Court nearly always sided with the government against
believers seeking exemptions. FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND
STATE 98-99 (1995) (observing that the religious exemption doctrine was never extended be-
yond the narrow facts of the cases that established it).
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trine in 1990.71 The law since then is clear, if still controversial: The
Free Exercise Clause does not afford religious individuals and groups
special protection against incidental burdens on their beliefs and prac-
tices, but protects only against intentional religious discrimination. 72
Just as nineteenth century Latter-day Saints could claim no constitu-
tional dispensation from complying with traditional laws that man-
dated monogamy, so believers today must also comply with laws that
burden their religious beliefs and practices, unless they can prove that
the burden is the result of intentional religious discrimination.73
A similar transformation has occurred in Establishment Clause doc-
trine. The principle of religious nondiscrimination constitutionalized
by Employment Division v. Smith74 now animates the Establishment
Clause as well. 75 When the Court first began to interpret the Estab-
lishment Clause in the 1940s, it treated religion as a distinctive and
even aberrant practice in a secular democracy, one that was accord-
ingly subject to distinctive burdens. Religion, it was thought, needed
to be constitutionally separated from public life, and discriminatory
burdens on religious beliefs and practices were justified precisely on
the ground that they were necessary in order to preserve political
freedom.76
71. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
72. See id. at 879 ("The right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law pros-
cribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))); see also City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512-16 (1997) and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (affirming and defending the basic holding of Smith).
73. See GEDICKS, supra note 70, at 108 (observing that Smith "brought free exercise jurispru-
dence full circle" by resurrecting Reynolds).
74. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
75. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947) (describing the persecutions of
Reformation Europe and colonial American that purportedly inspired the Establishment
Clause); see also GEDICKS, supra note 70, at 19-21 (Everson initiated a doctrinal regime of "sec-
ular neutrality" that requires that "government remain detached and neutral with respect to the
religious choices of its citizens," and implies that a "wholly secular society is possible and per-
haps even preferable."); Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983
Sup. CT. REV. 83, 83 (positing that "government action concerning religion is particularly likely
to be judged unconstitutional by the courts"). See generally PHILLIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (giving a detailed history of the origin and development of
separationism); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 284-327 (2001) (describing the various secular, nativist, and
sectarian impulses in American culture that coalesced into separationism).
76. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (" 'The structure of our government has, for the preserva-
tion of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other
hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority."' (quoting Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 731 (1872))).
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Beginning in the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court began to
abandon separationism, relying instead on viewpoint- and content-
neutrality doctrines imported from the Free Speech Clause. 77 The
Court held repeatedly that government could not discriminate against
speech in public forums on the basis of religious viewpoint or con-
tent.78 It was not long before the Court extended this religious non-
discrimination principle to programs of government aid.79 It is now
the law that religious organizations may not be precluded from receiv-
ing government assistance simply because of their religious character,
albeit with two qualifications: Religious organizations must meet all
secular requirements, and the decision whether any particular organi-
zation receives government assistance must be made by private indi-
viduals rather than government officials.8 0 So long as these conditions
are met, churches and religious groups cannot be excluded from pro-
grams of government assistance.
As the doctrinal momentum of religious nondiscrimination acceler-
ated into the 1990s, it appeared that neutrality and nondiscrimination
would eventually overtake all of Religion Clause doctrine, fully eclips-
ing separationism. 81 Yet what was expected never occurred. Signifi-
cant areas of church-state relations remain subject to separationist
doctrine, including church-state interactions that involve government
77. For an account of this development, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Neutrality in Establish-
ment Clause Interpretation: Its Past and Future, in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS 191
(Stephen V. Monsma ed., 2002).
78. Good News Club v. Milford Ctr. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842-46 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
248-49 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981).
79. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649-653 (2002) (upholding elementary
and secondary school tuition voucher plan that included religious schools as eligible partici-
pants); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-14 (2000) (upholding government lending of equip-
ment to public and private elementary and secondary schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
230-32 (1997) (upholding provision of remedial education, guidance, and job counseling services
by public school employees to low-income students attending private elementary and secondary
schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Hills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1993) (upholding government
provision of sign language interpreter to a deaf student attending Roman Catholic high school);
Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-89 (1986) (upholding state
payment of vocational rehabilitation grant on behalf of blind recipient studying for ministry at
Bible college); Mueler v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397-99 (1983) (upholding tax deduction for tui-
tion, textbook, and transportation expenses incurred in sending a child to public or private ele-
mentary or secondary school).
80. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 1071, 1101 (2002); see, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649-55; Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-12 (plu-
rality opinion).
81. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230,
246-47 (1992).
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participation in religious worship and speech,82 internal disputes
among the members of churches and other religious groups,83 the del-
egation of government power to churches and other religious
groups,8 4 and state pursuit of a stricter separation of church and state
than is required by the federal Establishment Clause. 85
The constitutional history of Religion Clause doctrine can be read
as a more recent and compact parallel to the metaphysical decline of
the West-that is, the progressive shift from the Christian narrative
which organized government and society on belief, to the Enlighten-
ment narrative founded on progress and emancipation, to the
postmodern dialectic of spirituality and fundamentalism. Far more
went on in the Mormon Polygamy Cases, for example, than simple
affirmation that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect against inci-
dental burdens.86 The anti-bigamy laws enforced against Latter-day
Saint polygamists were grounded in Protestant beliefs about the true
and essential nature of marriage, an issue that resonates over the de-
cades to our day. Polygamy is described as a barbaric, uncivilized and,
most notably, unChristian practice;8 7 by contrast, monogamous mar-
riage-the "union for life of one man and one woman in the holy
82. See Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding unconstitutional
student-led prayers at public high school football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(holding unconstitutional prayers at public school graduation ceremonies); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a state statute encouraging voluntary prayer in pub-
lic schools); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding unconstitutional Bible reading
during public school opening exercises); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding unconstitu-
tional a program of daily prayer recitation in public school classrooms).
83. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1
(1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). But see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)
(holding that courts may adjudicate such disputes when they can do so on the basis of religiously
neutral principles of law).
84. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (holding that a statute impermissibly
delegated government authority where the statute created a school district along geographic
lines correlated with religious affiliation); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 123-27 (1982)
(striking down a statute that permitted a church or school to veto the liquor license applications
of establishments located within 500 feet of the church or school).
85. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (holding that a state may exclude pastoral
courses of study from a state scholarship program even when such exclusion is not mandated by
the Establishment Clause).
86. For instance, it is far from clear that the anti-bigamy laws deployed against the Latter-day
Saints imposed burdens on plural marriage that were, in fact, merely incidental rather than in-
tentional and discriminatory.
87. E.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890) (describing polygamy as "abhorrent to the sentiments and feelings of the
civilized world," a "barbarous practice," and "contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the
civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western world"); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333, 341 (1890) ("Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian
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estate of matrimony"-is characterized as "the sure foundation of all
that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in so-
cial and political improvement. '88 Confident that it knew God's de-
sign for marriage, the Court did not hesitate to confirm the
constitutional validity of the federal government's interventions
against the Mormon church, interventions that eventually brought the
church to the brink of extinction and forced it to abandon the practice
of a central theological precept as the price of survival.
89
Of course, the Mormons were by no means the only religious mi-
norities to suffer from government enforcement of a singular view of
truth and reality. Jehovah's Witnesses and Roman Catholics suffered
persecutions well into the twentieth century, to say nothing of the bur-
dens heaped upon Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and other practitioners
of minority religions. 90
Mark De Wolfe Howe described the relationship between Ameri-
can government and Protestant religion during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries as a "de facto Protestant establishment." 91
Although no denomination was formally established as a national or
state church, Protestant theology was understood to constitute one of
the pillars of a civilized republican society. Thus, federal and state
governments legislated a broad range of Protestant beliefs and prac-
tices, such as: Requiring public school students to read from the King
James Bible; sponsoring group prayer in state legislatures and public
schools; recognizing Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Easter as official
holidays; providing for expressions of allegiance to the Almighty on
coins, stamps, and government seals; enacting temperance and anti-
evolution laws; and generally imposing civil and social disabilities on
countries."); id. at 341-42 ("To call [the] advocacy [of bigamy and polygamy] a tenet of religion
is to offend the common sense of mankind.").
88. Davis, 133 U.S. at 345; accord Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
89. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to
Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167 (1992).
90. See EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF AMERICA 273-75, 352 (2002) (describing
the persecution of Catholics, Jews, and Jehovah's Witnesses); MINORITY FAITHS AND THE AMER-
ICAN PROTESTANT MAINSTREAM (Jonathan D. Sarna ed., 1998) (a collection of papers on the
experiences of members of minority faiths in America, particularly Jews, Catholics, Mormons,
and African-American Protestants); GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF BIGOTRY IN THE UNITED
STATES (Henry M. Christman ed. & rev., 1960) (cataloguing religiously motivated persecution in
America through the 1960s, particularly against Catholics, Jews, Masons, and Mormons); SHAWN
FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN
OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000) (narrating the persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses, particu-
larly in the mid-twentieth century, and arguing that their resistance helped to bring about many
of the religious and civil liberties we enjoy today).
91. See generally MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965).
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non-Protestants and (especially) nonbelievers. 92 Although religious
nonconformity was tolerated, this toleration extended only as far as
nonconforming beliefs and practices did not threaten the Protestant
morality on which civilized republican government was presumed to
rest. 93 As the Supreme Court declared at the height of the de facto
establishment, Christianity-by which it meant Protestant Christian-
ity-forms part of the common law, and the United States is thus "a
Christian nation." 94
Religion Clause doctrine shed the Christian narrative in the 1940s
with a burst of historically dubious rhetoric which recharacterized re-
ligion from the necessary social foundation of the good and the true,
to an inherently persecutorial and destabilizing influence that
threatened social and political stability. In the first Establishment
Clause decision of the modern era, the Court described the period
prior to American colonization as
filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large
part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute po-
litical and religious supremacy .... In efforts to force loyalty to
whatever religious group happened to be on top and in league with
the government of a particular time and place, men and women had
been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed. 95
The Court referred to religious dissenters in the colonies themselves
who were forced "to pay tithes and taxes to support government-
sponsored churches whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons
designed to strengthen and consolidate the established faith by gener-
ating a burning hatred against dissenters. '96 This rhetorical image of
religion as a threat to the social order and to the advancement of
knowledge recurred into the 1980s.97
This image of religion is embedded in the narrative of Enlighten-
ment-of disenchantment and demythification, neutrality and objec-
tivity-in which secular knowledge is the preeminent discourse of
calm rationality, and religion is a destabilizing superstition that must
92. See GEDICKS, supra note 70, at 16.
93. See David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern
America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (1991) ("[A]n interde-
nominational Protestantism was both culturally, and in a certain sense, legally, dominant, even as
those of other faiths were allowed to practice their faith within the constraints of civil law.").
94. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
95. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947).
96. Id. at 10.
97. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968).
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be kept out of government and other avenues of public life. 98 For the
next four decades, virtually all forms of government assistance to re-
ligion were read through the lenses of suspicion and fear that religion
would capture government power.99 Religious practice was protected
by the exemption doctrine, just as the liberal state generally protects
all dissenting ideologies, but religion itself is not credited as a source
of useful knowledge.
III. RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Two competing conceptions of belief, "spirituality" and "fundamen-
talism," are now vying for the public space that previously was the
exclusive domain of reason and science.
A. Spirituality
In a monograph provocatively entitled Spiritual, But Not Religious,
Robert Fuller defined "spirituality" as the attitude of one struggling to
understand how his or her life relates to a greater cosmic scheme. 100
According to Fuller, "We encounter spiritual issues every time we
wonder where the universe comes from, why we are here, or what
happens when we die," as well as when we are "moved by values such
as beauty, love, or creativity that seem to reveal a meaning or power
beyond our visible world."''1 Fuller argued that "[a]n idea or practice
is 'spiritual' when it reveals our personal desire to establish a felt-rela-
tionship with the deepest meanings or powers governing life."
102
A noteworthy dimension of the new spirituality is its loose denomi-
national and creedal character. Spirituality capitalizes on the declin-
ing number of Americans who practice their religion in strict
98. See GEDICKS, supra note 70, at 34 (referring to secularism's "nightmare of particularist
religious beliefs subverting public life-the imposition of values by the irrational, passionate, and
violent overthrow of rationality, reason, and peace").
99. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion
Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they
could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of
government. The highways of church and state relationships are not likely to be one-
way streets, and the Constitution's authors sought to protect religious worship from the
pervasive power of government. The history of many countries attests to the hazards of
religion's intruding into the political arena or of political power intruding into the legiti-
mate and free exercise of religious belief.
Id. See generally Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 75, at 284-90 (summarizing decisions from this
period).
100. ROBERT C. FULLER, SPIRITUAL, BUT NOT RELIGIOUS 8 (2001).
101. Id. at 8-9.
102. Id. at 9.
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accordance with the teachings and doctrines of a traditional denomi-
nation. 10 3 Many believers see the catechisms and other theological
boundaries of denominational religion as obstacles to personal quests
for spiritual meaning.'0 4 As Fuller suggests, they describe themselves
as "spiritual," but not "religious. '' 10 5 Fuller estimates that as many as
one in five Americans may fit this description. 0 6 If accurate, this fig-
ure would mean that there are nearly as many spiritually "un-
churched" people in the United States as there are members of any
single denomination.10 7
The influence of the new spirituality is not confined to the un-
churched, but has reached into denominational religion to alter the
relationship of church members to their churches. Those who retain a
denominational affiliation are increasingly shifting their religious com-
mitment away from strict adherence to the beliefs and practices of
their denomination in the direction of personal spirituality. 108 In
other words, religion is becoming consumerized. Many religious
Americans now "shop" for a church to attend like they do for con-
sumer goods, choosing one because of the individual needs and pref-
erences that it satisfies, rather than the truth of the doctrines it
teaches.'0 9 Related and growing phenomena are so-called "cafeteria"
103. See, e.g., Peter L. Berger, Reflections on the Sociology of Religion Today, 62 Soc. RELIG-
ION 443, 446, 447 (2001) (noting the "declining number of people who profess traditional relig-
ious beliefs," and who define and practice "their religiosity in nontraditional, individualized and
institutionally loose ways"); see also BARBARA HARGROVE, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
126-27 (1979) (observing that ecumenicism was the first response of Christianity to post-Chris-
tian religious pluralism); Charles Trueheart, Welcome to the Next Church, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Aug. 1996, at 37. Trueheart conceptualizes the decline:
No spires. No crosses. No robes. No clerical collars. No hard pews. No kneelers.
No biblical gobbledygook. No prayerly rote. No fire, no brimstone. No pipe organs.
No dreary eighteenth-century hymns. No forced solemnity. No Sunday finery. No
collection plates.
This list has asterisks and exceptions, but its meaning is clear. Centuries of European
tradition and Christian habit are deliberately being abandoned, clearing the way for
new, contemporary forms of worship and belonging.
Id.
104. FULLER, supra note 100, at 4.
105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; accord Berger, supra note 103, at 448.
106. FULLER, supra note 100, at 1, 4-5.
107. See ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION 183 (2003).
108. This is Fuller's thesis. See FULLER, supra note 100, at 9.
109. Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Practice and
its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 164 (2003).
Shopping for a new church, temple, or religious affiliation is now commonplace. In
the United States, a family that moves to a new town commonly shops around for the
church or other religious institution that suits them best. A person might be raised
Catholic, not participate in any organized religion for several years, spend a few months
in a Zen monastery, and then join the local Baptist church when she settles down and
marries. After ten years, when her family is relocated to another part of the country, it
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or "grocery cart" religion, terms which capture the practice of picking
and choosing which of the doctrines and practices of a denomination
one will observe, sometimes assembling personalized collections of
beliefs and practices from among the teachings and doctrines of di-
verse and antagonistic denominations and traditions.110 Charles Tay-
lor has succinctly captured this bewildering growth of "intermediate
positions" between atheism and orthodox belief in the United States
and other Western nations:
[Mlany people drop out of active practice while still declaring them-
selves as belonging to some confession or believing in God. On an-
other dimension, . . . a wider range of people express religious
beliefs that move outside Christian orthodoxy. Following in this
line is the growth of non-Christian religions, particularly those
originating in the Orient, and the proliferation of New Age modes
of practice, of views that bridge the humanist/spiritual boundary, of
practices that link spirituality and therapy. On top of this, more and
more people adopt what would earlier have been seen as untenable
positions; for example, they consider themselves Catholic while not
accepting many crucial dogmas, or they combine Christianity with
Buddhism, or they pray while not being certain they believe.
111
The proliferation of spirituality among formerly orthodox believers
(and, indeed, among some former unbelievers) is evident in the reac-
tions of denominational leaders to the demands of their parishioners.
Like manufacturers of consumer products, religions increasingly com-
pete to develop a brand that appeals to a target population.11 2 Thus,
many contemporary Christian denominations increasingly dilute their
doctrines and theologies in favor of a less divisive "religious nonjudg-
mentalism" that de-emphasizes denominational differences, doctrinal
is by no means unusual for the family to join a different religious group once they have
visited various institutions in the new town.
Id.; see also id. at 165 (relating the experience of a couple who reported that they "'shopped for
a church like they would shop for a car, looking for something comfortable and practical"' (cita-
tion omitted)); Trueheart, supra note 103, at 42 (observing that baby boomers "are a needy and a
motivated bunch-with lots of experience in shopping for spiritual comfort").
110. French, supra note 109, at 165-66; accord Berger, supra note 103, at 448 (describing use
of Levi-Strauss's term bricolage to characterize this form of religiosity-that is, "people putting
together a religion of their own like children tinkering with a lego-set, picking and choosing from
available religious 'material"').
111. CHARLES TAYLOR, VARIETIES OF RELIGION TODAY 106-07 (2002). Taylor notes that in
the United States, the consumerization of religion resonates with the general consumer culture
that developed in the wake of the dramatic growth of economic well-being in the latter half of
the twentieth century. Id. at 102-03; see also Marty, supra note 5, at 664 (noting the
"postmodern approach in organized religion, where the chaos of the marketplace and the 'pick-
ing and choosing' of religions have prevailed").
112. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Religious Experience in the Age of Digital
Reproduction, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 127, 154-55 (2005) (noting the consumerization of religion
and religious experience triggered and facilitated by digitization and postmodernism).
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requirements, and traditional themes like duty, responsibility, and sin,
in favor of more comforting, inclusive, and therapeutic themes like the
inherent worth of each individual, and the unconditional love that
God holds for each person despite his or her imperfections.'1 3 Ac-
cording to Alan Wolfe, "[t]alk of hell, damnation, and even sin has
been replaced [in American churches] by a nonjudgmental language
of understanding and empathy. ' '114 Sin is transformed from an of-
fense against a holy God, to a self-defeating behavior.11 5
Perhaps the most important effect of spirituality is the change it has
wrought on the understanding of denominational religion by those
Americans who continue to value it. The traditional denominational
church "held and dispensed the 'means of grace' through which the
individual might attain salvation and without which that salvation was
in jeopardy. 11 6 One of the principal tasks of the traditional denomi-
nation was to police the conformity of parishioners to the behavioral
and creedal requirements of membership, and to certify the good
standing before God of those members who comply with these re-
quirements. 117 In the contemporary church, however, "the individual
is the focus and the exerciser of power"; 118 individuals judge their re-
ligion on the basis of whether it helps them to understand and dis-
cover themselves in the midst of the demands of their everyday life,
rather than whether its teachings and doctrines conform to an external
and ultimate divine reality.119
One should not assume from all this that spirituality is a trivial or
superficial approach to God. To the contrary, spiritual believers may
113. See WOLFE, supra note 107, at 155-84. Spirituality has accelerated a movement towards
nondenominationalism that was already well under way in the 1960s. See, e.g., T. Luckmann,
The Decline of Church-Oriented Religion, in SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 141, 147 (Roland Robert-
son ed., 1969).
One of the most important developments in American church religion is the process
of doctrinal leveling. It can be safely said that within Protestantism doctrinal differ-
ences are virtually irrelevant for the members of the major denominations. Even for
the ministry traditional theological differences seem to have an ever-decreasing impor-
tance. More significant is the steady leveling of the differences between Catholicism,
Protestantism, and Judaism .... There can be little doubt.., that Catholicism, Protes-
tantism and Judaism are jointly characterized by similar structural transformations-a
bureaucratization along rational businesslike lines-and accommodation to the "secu-
lar" way of life.
Id.
114. WOLFE, supra note 107, at 3.
115. Id. at 166.
116. HARGROVE, supra note 103, at 128.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Again, Taylor suggests that the self-oriented character of spirituality is the result of a
long series of developments in western history. See TAYLOR, supra note 111, at 8-13.
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take their beliefs very seriously.'20 What is different about spirituality
is not the seriousness with which its adherents believe, but rather the
focus of that belief. For spiritually inclined Americans, religion is
about revelation of the immanent, rather than the transcendent.
Whereas the focus of religion has historically been its revelation of the
reality beyond the temporal self, spirituality is centered on uncovering
the reality of that very self.121 Spirituality casts religion less as the
demand that believers fit themselves into God's plan, than as the de-
mand of believers for a comfortably fitting God and plan.
122
B. Fundamentalism
The term *,fundamentalism" originated in the reaction of American
evangelicals to the secularization and permissiveness of the 1920s.
123
A "fundamentalist" in those days signified one who was ready to fight
these trends by returning to the "fundamentals" of evangelical Protes-
tantism.124 Fundamentalism was chiefly characterized by militant re-
sistance to modernism, 2 5 deep commitment to biblical literalism and
an exceptionalist conception of truth,126 and nostalgia for an earlier
era in which Protestant faith and morality were reinforced by govern-
120. For example, a good friend of mine, who I know is deeply religious, was dissatisfied with
the congregation provided by his denomination when he moved to a new town. He and his wife
sought out congregations from other denominations until they found one that resonated with the
spiritual sensibilities of their family.
121. See WOLFE, supra note 107, at 182-84; see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinc-
tive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 67 (2002) (em-
phasizing "a profound change in the sociological, psychological, and intellectual role of religion
in American life").
[A]t the time of the Framing, religion, for many Americans, was a source of compre-
hensive understanding about Divine Providence and the order of the universe. The rise
of science, technology, psychoanalysis, and other profoundly secularizing influences,
however, has altered perceptions about the role of religion. For many Americans, re-
ligion is now affective, psychological, and interior. Instead of being about the way
things originated, are presently and will continue to be, religion, for many, is about the
way one feels and copes with the vicissitudes of contemporary life.
Id.
122. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 111, at 101 ("For many people today, to set aside their own
path in order to conform to some external authority just doesn't seem comprehensible as a form
of spiritual life.").
123. GILLES KEPEL, THE REVENGE OF GOD 105 (Alan Braley trans., 1994); MARSDEN, supra
note 29, at 50-56.
124. ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at 171; BRUCE B. LAWRENCE, DEFENDERS OF GOD: THE
FUNDAMENTALIST REVOLT AGAINST THE MODERN AGE 168-69 (1989); MARSDEN, supra note
29, at 57.
125. ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at 174; KEPEL, supra note 123, at 105; MARSDEN, supra note
29, at 66-67.
126. KEPEL, supra note 123, at 106.
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ment and law.' 2 7 The Darwinian challenge to literal interpretation of
the biblical creation account was a particular concern of American
fundamentalists during the early twentieth century. 128
Contemporary American fundamentalists constitute between 10
and 20 million people, or about a fourth of all American evangeli-
cals. 129 Contemporary American fundamentalism remains focused on
concerns similar to those that gave it birth nearly a century ago. As-
sailed on all sides by the decadent values of American popular cul-
ture, today's fundamentalists still seek protection in the stability of
Biblical commands. They remain hostile to Darwinism.' 30 They link
extramarital sex, abortion, gay rights, and feminism as common
threats to the traditional family, the preservation of which is a particu-
lar concern of fundamentalists. 131 They not only continue to admire
past regimes marked by much closer interaction of government and
Protestant religion, 132 but also are increasingly engaged in political ef-
forts to enlist government in their fight against modernism. 133
This is not to say that contemporary American fundamentalists are
intimidated by threats to their values. To the contrary, fundamental-
ists possess a "supreme confidence on religious questions" that stems
127. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at 172 (observing that the premillenarian vision of early
twentieth century fundamentalists was "xenophobic, fearful of foreign influence seeping into the
nation through Catholics, communists, and Higher Critics," and "ambivalent about democracy,"
fearing it would "lead to 'mob rule"'); see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 75, at 297-306 (relat-
ing how the de facto Protestant establishment of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
collapsed in the mid-twentieth century under the pressure of modernist influences and growing
Catholic political power).
128. See LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 170; MARSDEN, supra note 29, at 34, 59; see also ARM-
STRONG, supra note 30, at 175-77 (describing William Jennings Bryan's opposition to evolution,
including his disastrous testimony at the Scopes trial).
129. Linder, supra note 33, at 6.
130. LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 181. Professor Lawrence has suggested that fundamental-
ists now oppose evolution more as a symbol of modernist decadence than as a literal falsehood.
Id. at 186.
131. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at 266, 311; KEPEL, supra note 123, at 135; LAWRENCE,
supra note 124, at 186; WOLFE, supra note 107, at 251.
132. See, e.g., ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at 273 (describing contemporary American funda-
mentalist admiration for the theocratic governments established by Puritan colonists); see also
Marty, supra note 5, at 660 (stating that "[i]t is often presumed, at least by the more nostalgic
souls, that at certain moments-e.g., for the West, in medieval Christendom or, for America, in
certain colonial situations of religious establishment, there was coherence because the legal
sphere was coextensive with the religious.")
133. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at 310-16; KEPEL, supra note 123, at 116-17. See, e.g.,
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 75, at 342 (describing the efforts of Reverend Jerry Falwell and
others "to convince fellow believers to abandon what was now called 'the myth' that fundamen-
talists should avoid politics"); see also LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 86 ("Fundamentalists see a
point of tension between the demands of faith and the exercise of public authority. They would
like to compel all Americans to adopt their interpretation of the Constitution," though they
generally seek to work within the framework of democracy, rather than to subvert it.).
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from their belief that the Bible is the literal word of God, open and
accessible to anyone.134 George Marsden describes fundamentalism
as a kind of "scholastic Protestantism," which assumes that the literal
meaning of the Bible is accurate about matters of science and history
as well as doctrine. 135 Since fundamentalists understand their knowl-
edge of the truth to be both objective and universally accessible, they
are not interested in dialogue about truth, and tend to view those with
whom they disagree as intellectually dishonest, consciously resistant to
the truth. 136 In the fundamentalist view, an "honest" examination of
"the facts" necessarily leads one to the truth.
137
By now, of course, fundamentalism has come to signify an approach
to religion much broader than the retrenchments of twentieth century
American evangelicals. American fundamentalism is only one mani-
festation of a worldwide movement that seeks to overturn secular so-
ciety and to refill the ensuing vacuum with a revitalized public
religion. 138 In the latter part of the twentieth century, "re-Christiani-
zation" movements arose in Europe, and "re-Islamization" swept
through both Europe and the Middle East, undermining sociological
predictions of the inevitable secularization of politics and society, and
reinvigorating Roman Catholic, evangelical Protestant, and Muslim
interventions in public life. 139
Contemporary global fundamentalism exhibits most of the charac-
teristics of 1920s American fundamentalism. Contemporary funda-
mentalists are scriptural literalists who subordinate their individual
interests to the absolute authority of a larger spiritual community that
134. MARSDEN, supra note 29, at 117-18.
135. Id. at 160.
136. See WOLFE, supra note 107, at 68, 251.
137. See MARSDEN, supra note 29, at 117-19. In this sense, American fundamentalists are
more early modern than premodern. Id. at 119; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 3.
Because modernity is global, so is fundamentalism.... The name in English is linked to
turn-of-the-century Protestant Christianity, yet fundamentalism, like other reactions to
modernity, has been at once cross-creedal and multi-cultural. Fundamentalism is as
intrinsic and inevitable to Israeli haredim and Sunni or Shi'i Muslims as it is to Ameri-
can Protestants.
Id.
139. See, e.g., ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at ix ("One of the most startling developments of
the late twentieth century has been the emergence within every major religious tradition of a
militant piety popularly known as 'fundamentalism."'); KEPEL, supra note 123, at 2 (observing
that during the 1970s, a "new religious approach took shape, aimed no longer at adapting to
secular values but at recovering a sacred foundation for the organization of society-by changing
society if necessary"); see also Mailloux, supra note 10, at 1584 (noting the existence of "certain
anti-modernist movements within traditional religions including Christianity, Judaism and
Islam").
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is believed to embody the one true religion.1 40 Dan Conkle, for exam-
ple, describes contemporary fundamentalism as encompassing any re-
ligion that regards its texts, doctrines, and other sources of authority
as absolute, plain, and unchangeable guarantors of truth.141 Contem-
porary fundamentalists also continue to resist secular Enlightenment
ideals and modernism generally. 142 Moreover, because they see con-
flicts between religion and modernism as struggles between good and
evil, they tend to be intolerant of those who disagree with them.1 43
Like their American forebears, contemporary fundamentalists are
nostalgic for an earlier time in which religion and government at least
shared common moralities and goals, if they were not actually
united.1 4 4 Unlike their American forebears, however, who tended to
withdraw from public life as much as they engaged it, contemporary
global fundamentalists are more inclined to be politically active, if not
actually subversive; they challenge secularism in public life head-on,
by urging their particular religious truth as the sole governing ethic. 145
140. See LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 5-6 (positing that in addition to a commitment to
scriptural literalism, fundamentalism is also "an appeal to one community as authoritative inter-
preters of the pure, the sole, the 'inerrant' sense of scripture"); id. at 108-09 ("For [fundamental-
ist] believers, their community identity is vouchsafed by the authenticity attributed to their
original scripture. Their loyalty as individual believers is measured by their corporate assent to
precepts set forth within the canon. The canon looms as the fixed measure and the standard of
all revealed truth.").
141. Daniel 0. Conkle. Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Compet-
ing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & RELIION 1, 14 (1994); see also
KEPEL, supra note 123, at 34, 35 (observing that the Society for the Propagation of Islam urges
copying the life of the Prophet Mohammad "in the smallest of actions," and defines "'straying'
as any aspect of modem life that was not exclusively inspired by reference to the Prophet"); see
also Conkle, supra, at 14 (noting that a fundamentalist "source of truth is absolute in the sense
that it cannot be questioned on the basis of external evidence or arguments[,] . . .plain in the
sense that it requires little if any interpretation[, and] unchangeable in the sense that it need not
be adapted to contemporary circumstances").
142. LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 6-8, 91, 101.
143. See, e.g., KEPEL, supra note 123, at 107 (arguing that the United States is prone to revert
to fundamentalism "in times of stress, in the tradition of the Great Awakenings," and that funda-
mentalists tend to identify catastrophes as God's punishment for apostasy, seizing "upon the
multifarious crises that have afflicted American society down to our own day, always ready with
both a diagnosis and a cure-the cure of redemption"); LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 114 (not-
ing that for contemporary fundamentalists, "[aill are God's soldiers or His enemies").
144. See JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN 137 (2003) ("The impetus for
most fundamentalist movements ... is a yearning to return to the mythical order and perfection
of the original church."); see also LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 15 (arguing that the three critical
characteristic aspects of contemporary global fundamentalism are "the invocation of scripture,
the reference to the past, the reliance on charismatic intermediaries").
In Islamic countries there is no such nostalgia, but only because the past is still present. The
separation of government and religion has only recently emerged as a possibility for Muslim
societies, and still enjoys only sporadic and qualified Muslim support.
145. See KEPEL, supra note 123, at 4, 5 (noting that contemporary fundamentalists "share the
remarkable characteristic of challenging the way society is organized: either its secular founda-
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Bruce Lawrence nicely encapsulates the characteristics of contempo-
rary global fundamentalism when he defines it as "the affirmation of
religious authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of neither criti-
cism nor reduction," combined with "the collective demand that spe-
cific creedal and ethical dictates derived from scripture be publicly
recognized and legally enforced.' '
46
Fundamentalism is everything that spirituality is not. The funda-
mentalist truth is hard, literal, and exclusive, 147 what God has plainly
revealed in his scriptures or to his servants.148 This literalism prevents
fundamentalism from accommodating believers looking for flexibility
in their commitments to particular religious practices, doctrines, or
forms of worship. Fundamentalism's God is also the polar opposite of
the God of spirituality; the fundamentalist God is a jealous one, hav-
tion-as in France-or its secular deviations from a foundation which is in part based on relig-
ion, as in the United States or the Islamic countries," and that contemporary fundamentalists
basically demand "a link with religion as the foundation of the social system"); id. at 191
(describing how contemporary fundamentalists seek to change the "social order so as to bring it
into line with the commands and the values of the Old Testament, the Koran or the Gospels");
see also ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at 360-63 (describing the persistence of violent and subver-
sive strains of American fundamentalism including Operation Rescue, Christian Reconstruction,
Branch Davidians, and Christian Identity); Marty, supra note 5, at 663 (noting fundamentalist
strains of Islam, Judaism, and Protestantism that have "set out to reclaim regimes entirely," and
identifying other American evangelical forces with the more modest goal of claiming a "signifi-
cant element in politics through the use of coalition and caucus strategies"); Frederick Clarkson,
Christian Reconstruction: Theocratic Dominionism Gains Influence, VIII THE PUBLIC EYE MAG.
pt. 1 (Mar-June 1994), available at http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v08nl/chrisrec.html (de-
tailing the growth and influence of the Christian reconstruction movement, which generally
"seeks to replace democracy with a theocratic elite that would govern by imposing their interpre-
tation of 'Biblical Law"'); Linder, supra note 33, at 25-26 (describing "Christian Americanism,"
a Calvinist view that church and state should be "separate but interlocking," held by "mostly
fundamentalist Protestants and conservative Roman Catholics who believe that the United
States was established as a Christian nation-and who long to restore it"); Dean Schabner, S.
Carolina Targeted for Christian State, ABC NEWS, Aug. 12, 2004, at http://abcnews.go.comtUS/
story?id=96695&page=l (reporting on group of conservative Christians that plans to move to
South Carolina in groups of 12,000 to establish a state government based on the Ten Command-
ments and "conservative Christian values").
146. LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 27; accord Mailloux, supra note 10, at 1584 (describing
contemporary fundamentalist movements as characterized by "radical criticism of secular mo-
dernity, Manichean narratives of communal identity, selective interpretations of scriptural texts,
rhetorical intolerance of ideological disagreement, charismatic leadership and zealous disciple-
ship, and profoundly intense commitment to action for the cause").
147. See VATrIMO, supra note 9, at 87-88 (stating that theologically conservative Christians
"always complain that in the secularized or weak conception of Christianity, the harshness, se-
verity, and rigour characteristic of divine justice are lost, and with them the very meaning of sin,
the actuality of evil, and as a consequence even the necessity of redemption").
148. See MARSDEN, supra note 29, at 118-19, 159-60; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at
5-6 (noting that more than a commitment to literal interpretation of sacred texts, fundamental-
ism is "also an appeal to one community as authoritative interpreters of the pure, the sole, the
'inerrant' sense of scripture"); id. at 27 (defining fundamentalism as "the affirmation of religious
authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of neither criticism nor reduction").
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ing placed the world under his judgment-"under God"-to suffer his
wrath and punishment unless it repents and returns to the one, true
path. 149 Fundamentalism presupposes a single, transcendent reality
which does not change, and to which believers must consequently ac-
commodate themselves, rather than vice versa. 150 In the fundamental-
ist world, the Bible or the Koran, the clergy or the imams, grant access
to reality, and it is a reality that excludes all others. 151
C. Contrasts
Spirituality and fundamentalism differ in where they locate the sa-
cred. Spirituality is focused on self-discovery, the "reality within,"
whereas fundamentalism is focused on an already evident reality that
is external to the self. As a consequence, for practitioners of spiritual-
ity there can be multiple realities, whereas for fundamentalists there is
only one.
Spirituality and fundamentalism are also distinguishable on the ba-
sis of their relationship to politics and government. In general, spiritu-
ality seeks freedom from government, so as to leave its seekers free to
fashion the conception of the sacred that is best suited to them. Con-
temporary fundamentalism, however, seeks more than freedom from
government; rather, it seeks to enlist government in endorsing and
enforcing the singular conception of reality around which it is organ-
ized. Nevertheless, not all contemporary fundamentalists seek gov-
ernment power; in fact, until the 1970s, the historic stance of
American fundamentalism had been withdrawal from the corruptions
of government and society, rather than political engagement. 152 Simi-
larly, though spirituality seems open and nondogmatic about ultimate
149. See KEPEL, supra note 123, at 107, 110-11; LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 24.
150. See KRAKAUER, supra note 144, at 166 ("In the fundamentalist worldview, a sharp divid-
ing line runs through all of creation, demarcating good from evil, and everybody falls on one side
of that line or the other."); LAWRENCE, supra note 124, at 121 ("Every expression of fundamen-
talism ... has a double emphasis: the collective good above individual choice, and advocacy of
one interpretation of the collective good against all others, especially all inside others. To the
recurring question, Are there any absolutes in a changing world? [Flundamentalists respond
with a triumphant 'Yes!"'); see also MARSDEN, supra note 29, at 178 (As Richard Hofstadter
observes, "'The fundamentalist mind.., is essentially Manichean; it looks upon the world as an
area for conflict between absolute good and absolute evil, and accordingly it scorns compromises
(who can compromise with Satan?)."').
151. See KEPEL, supra note 123, at 203.
152. See id. at 116-17; see also id. at 114 (comparing Reverend Jerry Falwell, who withdrew
the Moral Majority from political activity in advance of the 1988 presidential election, with Rev-
erend Pat Robertson, who sought the presidency in that election); MARSDEN, supra note 29, at
112 (relating how early twentieth century fundamentalists saw themselves as "outsiders from the
power centers of society, its politics, and its cultural life," and "viewed themselves as separated
from the worldly powers").
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truths, that openness can degenerate into its own kind of fundamen-
talism. Conservative believers especially are well acquainted with the
intolerance imposed on religion by contemporary regimes of
"tolerance."1 53
Finally, fundamentalism and spirituality may describe attitudes
about certain beliefs and practices within a denomination, which do
not necessarily apply to all denominational beliefs and practices.
154
For example, a member of a denomination may have the ecumenical
openness to other faiths that characterizes spirituality, yet still believe
that the ultimate purpose of religion is not discovering oneself but
accessing an objective reality, as fundamentalists believe. Similarly,
one may hold the spiritual belief that truth reveals itself experientially
rather than methodologically, yet also believe with fundamentalists
that truth can be known with such certainty that further searching and
reexamination is forever unnecessary. Accordingly, although there
are obviously fundamentalist and spiritual religions that conform to
the sketches I have rendered, it may be more accurate to think of
these as competing tendencies that often coexist more or less easily
even within a single faith or a single person.
Nevertheless, all qualifications aside, there is little doubt that we
live today, here and now, in a moment of global religious assertion,
not withdrawal, that is much more fundamentalist than spiritual.
Whatever may be the diversity of beliefs within their denominational
confines, religions throughout the world that are properly described as
"fundamentalist" are seeking political engagement and governmental
control. It is, therefore, entirely proper to label as "fundamentalism"
those contemporary religions that seek the coercive power of govern-
ment to encourage and to enforce respect for, if not outright conform-
ance to, a singular and transcendent divine reality.
IV. RELIGION CLAUSE DOCTRINE
This brings us to the present-to the end of modernity, the end of
all transcendent narratives and unifying explanations. Here we find
153. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 111, at 89 (noting "the soft relativism that seems to accom-
pany the ethic of authenticity: let each person do his or her own thing, and we shouldn't criticize
each other's 'values'; this is predicated on a firm ethical base, indeed, demanded by it.... The sin
that is not tolerated is intolerance."); Louis Bolce & Gerald De Maio, The Politics of Partisan
Neutrality, FIRST THINGS, May 2004, at 9, 9 (arguing that although "an aggressive Christian
right" has become politically active during the last generation, "the nonreligious have also be-
come aggressive actors on the political stage," possessing and promoting "an overarching
worldview of their own-one that can fairly be called secularism").
154. I am indebted to Michael Perry and Steven Smith for both this insight and the examples
of it that follow.
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Establishment and Free Exercise Clause doctrine constructed by a di-
alectic of spirituality and fundamentalism.
A. The Free Exercise Clause
It has become increasingly evident that religious nondiscrimination
is the only plausible understanding of what the Free Exercise Clause
can require in a religiously plural postmodern society marked by
growing interest in spirituality and declining interest in traditional de-
nominational religion. Confining religious exemptions to those affili-
ated with traditional denominations is biased against new or
unconventional religions,155 as well as against secular commitments
that are as morally serious as religion. 156 On the other hand, applying
the exemption doctrine so as to excuse from obedience to law any
person or group whose beliefs and practices are incidentally burdened
by law would result in significant numbers of people avoiding compli-
ance with virtually every law on the books.157 It was precisely this
155. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHj. L.
REV. 308, 311, 317 (1991).
A court is more likely to find against a[n exemption] claimant on definitional grounds
when the religion is bizarre, relative to the cultural norm, and is more likely to find that
a religious belief is insincere when the belief in question is, by cultural norms, incredu-
lous. The religious claims most likely to be recognized, therefore, are those that closely
parallel or directly relate to the culture's predominant religious traditions.
[T]he measure of the importance of a state interest underlying a government prohibi-
tion is a function of the mores of the society, and those mores, in turn, are often a
function of that society's religious values.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) ("One can, of
course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be
entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.").
156. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHi. L. REV. 1245, 1255
(1994) (stating that the exemption doctrine "privileges religious commitments over other deep
commitments"); Marshall, supra note 155, at 319 (noting that "[g]ranting exemptions only to
religious claimants promotes its own form of inequality: a constitutional preference for religious
over non-religious belief systems").
157. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("'Can a man excuse his [religious]
practices to the contrary [of the law] because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."' (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 166-67 (1879))); see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 ("[Rleligious beliefs need not be accept-
able, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protec-
tion."); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 156, at 1256.
[Ildiosyncracies [sic] in the welfare functions of some individuals will support extreme
and intuitively discreditable demands on social resources on their behalf . . . [yet]
[r]eligious belief need not be founded in reason, guided by reason, or governed in any
way by the reasonable. Accordingly, the demands that religions place on the faithful,
and the demands that the faithful can in turn place on society in the name of
unimpaired flourishing, are potentially extravagant.
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realization that started the Court on the road to restricting and even-
tually altogether eliminating the exemption doctrine.
The unworkability of the exemption doctrine, and the inevitability
of its replacement by religious nondiscrimination, was evident in the
draft exemption cases of the mid-1960s, decided only a few years after
the Court adopted the exemption doctrine. The first of these cases
involved a university student who sought exemption from the draft,
not on the basis of the teachings of a denominational religion or any
conventionally religious beliefs of his own that war is morally wrong,
but rather on the basis of a personal morality derived from his study
of mostly secular philosophy. 158 Clearly troubled by the unfairness
that would have been wrought by limiting draft exemptions to mem-
bers of denominational religions that teach the immorality of war, the
Court expanded the statutory definition of religious belief far beyond
its conventional meaning (not to mention the meaning intended by
Congress), to encompass a person's "'ultimate concern,'" or that
which a person takes "'seriously without any reservation.'",,59
Of course, a broad exemption of the kind potentially created by the
Court in the draft exemption cases threatened the efficient operation
of a military draft by allowing too many potential draftees to exit the
system. t60 Accordingly, the Court declined a later opportunity to
broaden the exemption to include those who oppose only unjust wars
rather than all wars.161 The Court, however, never directly confronted
the obvious unfairness inherent in a statute that allows members of
historic anti-war denominations to escape the draft, but not those who
conscientiously adhere to secular anti-war moralities and politics.
A similar dynamic affected the Court's decisions in the Amish Cases
of the 1970s and 1980s.162 Clearly sympathetic to the corrosive effect
Id.
158. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1965).
159. Id. at 187 (alteration in original) (quoting PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDA-
ro Ns 57 (1948)); accord Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970).
What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's conscientious objection to all war to
be "religious" within the meaning of §6(j) is that this opposition to war stem from the
registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and that
these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions.
Id.; see also Marty, supra note 5, at 666 (observing that the "tradition that saw religion dealing
always with a Supreme Being" is "thinned out" in Seeger and Welsh).
160. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971) ("Apart from the Government's
need for manpower, perhaps the central interest involved in the administration of conscription
laws is the interest in maintaining a fair system for determining who serves when not all serve."
(citations omitted)).
161. See id. (holding that the exemption applies only to those who conscientiously object to all
wars, and not to those who conscientiously object only to a particular war).
162. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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that mandatory school attendance laws had on the Amish religious
community, 163 the Court nevertheless feared the host of other groups
that might claim exemptions from such laws.164 It accordingly wrote
its exemption opinion so narrowly that it apparently applied only to
the Amish. 165 And when a decade later, in United States v. Lee,166 the
Amish sought exemption, not from the burden of compulsory school
attendance laws, but from paying social security self-employment
taxes, the Court shuddered at the potential avalanche of exemption
claims from others seeking to minimize their own taxes, 167 and denied
exemptions to everyone. 168
From Lee, it was a short step to eliminating the exemption doctrine
entirely, save for a few narrowly defined exceptions. After a period
during which the Court held that the exemption doctrine was inappli-
cable in several specific situations, 169 the Court largely abandoned the
test, holding in Smith that "the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law
163. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
As the record shows, compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children car-
ries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious prac-
tice as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society
at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.
Id. (citation omitted).
164. See, e.g., id. at 215-16 ("[Tlhe very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every
person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has impor-
tant interests.").
165. See id. at 235-36. The Court was "not dealing with a way of life and mode of education
by a group claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened process
for rearing children for modern life." Id. at 235. The Court further observed that "a history of
three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-suffi-
cient segment of American society" had enabled the Amish to make a "convincing showing"
that "few other religious groups or sects could make" of the "sincerity of their religious beliefs."
Id. at 235-36. Moreover, the Court acknowledged the "hazards presented by the State's en-
forcement" of the disputed statute, and the adequacy of the informal vocational training associ-
ated with Amish life as a substitute for compulsory high school education. Yoder, 406 U.S. at
235; see also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 222 (rev. 3d ed. 2000)
(observing that the Court "was careful to limit its decision [in Yoder] to groups like the Amish,
with their centuries-long history and general record of good behavior").
166. 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
167. See id. at 259-60 (observing that "it would be difficult to accommodate the comprehen-
sive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious
beliefs").
168. See id. at 261.
169. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (declining
to apply exemption doctrine to the free exercise burdens caused by federal decisions relating to
the use of federally owned land); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (declining to
apply the exemption doctrine to the free exercise burdens caused by federal prison regulations);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (declining to apply the exemption doctrine to the
free exercise burden caused by uniform regulations of U.S. military).
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of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." 70
B. The Establishment Clause
Establishment Clause doctrine has followed a trajectory compara-
ble to free exercise doctrine. As I have related, the Court began its
development of anti-establishment doctrine with a decided emphasis
on the necessity of separating church and state from each other's in-
fluence. In a society that eschews invidious discrimination, however,
that values equality of persons, organizations, and ideas, there is no
easy justification for denying persons and organizations the considera-
ble benefits of the social welfare state simply because they hold relig-
ious beliefs or observe religious practices. 171 Just as it was difficult
under the free exercise exemption doctrine to distinguish religious be-
liefs entitled to exemption from equally sincere and intense secular
commitments that were denied exemption, it also grew difficult to jus-
tify denying religious persons and organizations the social welfare
benefits and grants that routinely go to secular individuals and organi-
zations committed to ideologies no less intensely held or potentially
disruptive than religion.172
This became apparent in the 1980s, when the Court began to strug-
gle with the reality that its Establishment Clause doctrine was
founded on simultaneously opposing premises: "Neutrality" or relig-
ious nondiscrimination, and "separation" or discrimination against re-
ligion. In response, the Court began to narrow and abandon its
separationist holdings in favor of religious neutrality.
Religious antidiscrmination-that is, governmental neutrality
among religions and between religious and secular commitments-is a
doctrinal principle perfectly suited to accommodate the growing pop-
ular interest in spirituality in a pluralistic, postmodern America that
170. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)). The exemption doctrine remains part of the substantive protection af-
forded to religious practice by the Free Exercise Clause only in cases that involve the
coincidence of another constitutional right with the free exercise right-the so-called "hybrid
right" exception, id. at 881-82, and when government has set up a system of individualized ex-
emptions, id. at 884.
171. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
172. See GEDICKS, supra note 70, at 111 (arguing that if the "establishment clause does not
require that religious individuals be uniquely deprived of public welfare benefits otherwise gen-
erally available to all," then similarly the "free exercise clause does not require that religious
individuals be uniquely relieved of legal burdens otherwise generally imposed upon all").
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can no longer decisively demonstrate which beliefs are true, and which
are false.173 As Robin Lovin has argued,
It is not so much that the law denies the truth of religious claims and
says religious claims are, after all, only individual preferences. The
law-or at least the kind of law that is made by modern states-
simply does not know how to treat any idea or commitment as any-
thing else. 174
Under a regime of religious neutrality, Wiccans who worship pagan
gods, pacifists who oppose the war in Iraq, Santerians who sacrifice
household pets, animal rights advocates who agitate for increased pro-
tection of animals, New Age adherents who seek self-enlightenment,
political activists who seek social retrenchments or reforms-all re-
ceive the same doctrinal respect as the denominations of history.
Whether in protection from discrimination or in the distribution of
public benefits, contemporary Religion Clause doctrine barely permits
distinction among varieties of religious belief and secular moral
commitment.
Of course, this is only half of the story of Establishment Clause doc-
trine, for while the reach of neutrality is considerable, it is far from
complete. There remain the separationist decisions: those that ban
public school prayer and government sponsored religious displays,
that prevent government from resolving religious disputes within a
church or other religious organization, that prohibit government from
delegating its power to churches or directly funding religious worship,
that permit government to exclude religious education from a funding
program even when including it would not violate the Establishment
Clause. 175
Separationism has long been labeled discriminatory and anti-relig-
ious, a violation of the religious nondiscrimination principle. 176 These
arguments usually suggest that by invalidating government use of re-
173. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 75, at 368 ("In a nation of many faiths and none, it is hard
to square officially sponsored school prayer and Bible reading with any viable conception of
neutrality.").
174. See Robin W. Lovin, Church and State in an Age of Globalization, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,
3 (2002) ("[A]lthough religion may be uniquely convincing and motivating for individuals, it
becomes, for legal purposes, simply another individual preference, which persons are free to
pursue as they like within the framework law provides." (citation omitted)).
175. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with
Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 40 (1997) (arguing that the Court should
"not discriminat[e] in favor of secular organizations over religious organizations through the
funding of only the former"); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 115, 116 (1992) (lamenting that the Warren-Burger Court's separationist stance
"more closely resembled freedom from religion (except in its most private manifestations) than
freedom of religion" (citation omitted)).
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ligious symbols or beliefs, separationism privileges secularism.
177
Thus, invalidation of government display of the Christian nativity or
of the Ten Commandments, or reversing government removal of
evolution from (or its addition of creationism to) the public school
curriculum, is characterized as government establishment of the moral
or cultural superiority of Santa Claus or Charles Darwin to the Judeo-
Christian tradition.
There is a deep contradiction in this argument that usually goes un-
remarked, if not entirely unnoticed, by those who make it. To the
extent that these government sponsored religious symbols and beliefs
are portrayed as theologically vacuous, they are a rather ineffective
antidote to secularism. Yet, to the extent that their display or use sug-
gests serious theological content, the government's very act of appro-
priating them to its own uses violates the principle of religious
nondiscrimination. 178 As Gianni Vattimo has pointed out, if you want
to complain about the lack of Christ in Christmas, you cannot simulta-
neously complain about the lack of Christmas symbols in public life.
179
177. See Marty, supra note 5, at 668 (observing that "[m]any organizations on the religious
right" view Establishment Clause decisions-and particularly those banning public school
prayer-as "evidences that a 'secular humanist' conspiracy operates in the law and especially in
the Supreme Court"); see, e.g., John Whitehead & John Conlan, The Establishment of the Relig-
ion of Secular Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (1978).
The fundamentalist Pro-Family Forum defines "secular humanism" as a world view that, among
other things, denies the divinity of Jesus, Biblical inspiration, the existence of the soul, life after
death, heaven and hell, and the biblical account of creation. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 30, at
270-71.
178. Justice Brennan hinted at this contradiction in Lynch v. Donnelly:
Unlike such secular figures as Santa Claus, reindeer and carolers, a nativity scene rep-
resents far more than a mere "traditional" symbol of Christmas. The essence of the
creche's symbolic purpose and effect is to prompt the observer to experience a sense of
simple awe and wonder appropriate to the contemplation of one of the central ele-
ments of Christian dogma-that God sent His son into the world to be a Messiah.
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, the creche is far from a mere representation of a
"particular historic religious event." It is, instead, best understood as a mystical re-
creation of an event that lies at the heart of Christian faith. To suggest, as the Court
does, that such a symbol is merely "traditional" and therefore no different from Santa's
house or reindeer is not only offensive to those for whom the creche has profound
significance, but insulting to those who insist for religious or personal reasons that the
story of Christ is in no sense a part of "history" nor an unavoidable element of our
national "heritage."
465 U.S. 668, 711-12 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also GEDICKS, supra
note 70, at 79 (asserting that "[t]he accommodationist opinions in [Lynch and Allegheny] trans-
form the creche and the menorah from religious symbols of deep spiritual significance into cul-
tural artifacts").
179. See VATTIMO, supra note 2, at 101.
[C]hristians cannot claim the right to expose the crucifix in public schools and at the
same time adopt it as a sign of a particular, highly dogmatic religion. Or, Christmas can
continue to be celebrated in Western societies as a holiday for all, but then it makes no
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This is not to maintain that nondiscrimination or neutrality do not
reflect any privileges, for they clearly do. "Neutrality" is a misno-
mer-part of the vocabulary of objectivity left over from modernity. I
have generally used religious "nondiscrimination" in its place, but this
word, too, papers over a variety of value choices that determine what
kinds of distinctions the law may properly make between persons and
their beliefs, and what kinds it may not.
Our language is simply deficient, at least for now. Imagine if you
will, the legal language of three or four hundred years ago, as Western
society was beginning its shift from the Christian narrative of belief to
the Enlightenment narrative of modernity. Lawyers and scholars of
the early modern era did not speak in terms of "equality of persons,"
or "religious nondiscrimination," or "neutrality," or the "separation of
church and state," and the idea that there existed a physical truth
about the world that one could discover and demonstrate without re-
course to principles of theology was entirely foreign. It took decades,
if not centuries, for the West to develop the language that appropri-
ately captured the new concepts implicit in scientific rationality as
framed by Enlightenment thinking.
We have a language problem today that is not so different. We are
left with Enlightenment ideals of epistemological objectivity and
moral neutrality to describe the relationship of law and religion in an
era in which the possibility of such objectivity and neutrality has been
irretrievably lost.180 To say that spirituality is no more neutral than
fundamentalism proves nothing in such an age. The question is not,
which of spirituality or fundamentalism is "really" neutral, but rather,
which of these two conceptions of religion is better suited for our
times?
V. FUNDAMENTALIST FLAWS
Let me suggest three problems with fundamentalism as the pre-
ferred model of contemporary religion-or, if you prefer, three com-
parative advantages of spirituality over fundamentalism as such a
model. First, fundamentalism is currently impractical. As Wall Street
well knows, you cannot fight the market, even if the market is, some-
sense to complain that it has become too lay, too mundane, that is, that it has been
deprived of its original, authentic meaning.
Id.
180. Cf. LuDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON FRAZER'S GOLDEN BOUGH 10e (Rush Rhees
ed., A.C. Miles trans., 1979) ("A whole mythology is deposited in our language."); ARENDT,
supra note 3, at 25 (noting the "perplexity of having to deal with new phenomena in terms of an
old tradition of thought outside of whose conceptual framework no thinking seemed possible at
all").
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how, "really" wrong. Religion must speak to people where they live,
with answers to the problems they see as the most challenging. If be-
lievers are searching for immanence rather than transcendence, it is
because they perceive that immanence meets needs that transcen-
dence does not. If believers are convinced that self-discovery rather
than cosmic discovery should be the focus of their religious worship
and practices, then traditional denominational religions ignore this at
their peril.
Second, fundamentalism is epistemologically implausible. In the
face of radical religious diversity, digital access to global fields of relig-
ious information, and the epistemological and moral indeterminacy
brought on by postmodernism, the claim by any single religion that it
provides the only access to authentic religious experience is increas-
ingly greeted with incredulity. 181 In a market of only a few products
about which information is difficult and expensive to obtain, any one
of the market participants might plausibly claim (and typically all of
them do) that its product is the only one that works effectively. In a
market of hundreds of products about which information is ubiqui-
tous, that claim will not be accepted.
Finally, fundamentalism is politically unimaginable. It is not quite
impossible to imagine a majoritarian fundamentalist regime that at
least some religious minorities would find preferable to a majoritarian
regime committed to a spiritual conception of religion. One can envi-
sion, for example, that some American Christians might prefer to live
under a Buddhist or an Orthodox Jewish regime than the secularism
and aggressive toleration that might accompany a spiritual regime.
But it does appear quite impossible to imagine that most unbelievers
and most religious minorities-which in the United States means not
only Jews, but innumerable other non-Christians like Muslims, Bud-
dhists, Hindus, Sikhs, and so on, as well as Christians outside the
bounds of traditional orthodoxy, like Mormons or Jehovah's Wit-
nesses-would choose a majoritarian fundamentalist regime over a
181. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 112, at 149.
Americans have interactive access to a vast array of credible choices of religious experi-
ence, at the same time that the ability of any single religion decisively to demonstrate
its epistemological superiority has disappeared. In the face of such diversity and inde-
terminacy, no single religion can plausibly claim that it alone can access authentic relig-
ious experience.
Id.; see also Berger, supra note 103, at 449 ("Modernity pluralizes the lifeworlds of individuals
and consequently undermines all taken-for-granted certainties."); Marty, supra note 5, at 662
("[R]eligious pluralism is itself 'inherently disintegrative of all consensus and community.' ... In
the eyes and practices of the religious public, pluralism cannot be overcome because so many of
them conceive their faith to be based on specific and differing divine revelations to them." (cita-
tion omitted)).
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majoritarian spiritual one. No imaginable fundamentalist regime is
likely to command the preferences of most religious minorities and
unbelievers over a majoritarian spiritual regime.
None of this should be taken as a prediction or suggestion that fun-
damentalism is on the verge of disappearing. As Roger Hendrix and I
have argued elsewhere, fundamentalism is not likely to retain mass
appeal in a postmodern age, but that does not mean that it will not
persist as a kind of "niche product. ' 182 Indeed, significant numbers of
people are drawn to fundamentalist claims of moral certainty in the
metaphysical confusion that is endemic to postmodernism. Moreover,
certain classes, such as the desperately poor, find little point in search-
ing for the spiritual meaning of their situation, and find fundamental-
ist claims about transcendent reality attractive precisely because they
wish to transcend their situation.183 Fundamentalism is likely to per-
sist, but not as a mode of belief with mass appeal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Religious nondiscrimination is a doctrinal response to spirituality,
the quintessentially postmodern expression of belief. There is less
need to be vigilant about the influence on government of spirituality
because it is a form of belief focused on maximizing individual relig-
ious choice. This is not the same as saying that there is no need for
vigilance, for as I mentioned, spirituality and nondiscrimination can
lead to their own forms of oppression. Nevertheless, the instinct of
spirituality is for religious liberty in its classic form, as the residuum of
governmental absence, and not liberty in its more contemporary form,
as the creation of affirmative government action.
Separationism, on the other hand, is a doctrinal response to funda-
mentalism, the quintessentially premodern expression of belief. There
is greater need to be vigilant about the influence on government of a
form of belief whose focus is the alignment of government with a sin-
gular vision of the divine reality. Nondiscrimination responds to a
more tentative and thus more politically benign form of belief, separa-
tionism to a confident, robust, and even persecutorial form of belief.
Perhaps this is why, to answer Geoffrey Hartman, "so few in Western
democracies consider fundamentalism a serious solution to existential
and political dilemmas. '18 4 Religion Clause doctrine privileges spiri-
182. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 112, at 156-57.
183. I am grateful to Jack Balkan for this insight.
184. Hartman, supra note 49, at 1578.
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tuality over fundamentalism by applying nondiscrimination principles
to the former, and separationist doctrines to the latter.
Like the "spirit of liberty," the "spirit of spirituality" is "not too sure
that it is right."' 85 The spirit of fundamentalism, by contrast, is certain
that it cannot be wrong. The church-state interactions governed by
separationism rather than nondiscrimination respond to the risk that
fundamentalism could capture governmental functions and thereby
use government power to endorse and to enforce an exceptionalist
religious vision of reality. Fundamentalism longs for the return of the
premodern Christian metanarrative, in which the Scriptures, the
church, and the clergy functioned as the final arbiters of knowledge
and truth. Fundamentalism generates fear and controversy precisely
because it attempts to enlist the authority of the state on the side of a
universal account of the world and humanity's place in it, at a time
when all such narratives have dissolved into tentative and local truths.
Fundamentalism is not a plausible form for religious belief in a
postmodern era. If religion is to survive as the vital force it has always
been and still may be, it must do so as spirituality.
185. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND 549 (1994) ("'What then is the spirit of liberty? I
cannot define it; I can only tell you my own faith. The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too
sure that it is right."' (alteration in original) (quoting Judge Hand's famous speech delivered at
an observance of "I Am an American Day" in New York City's Central Park on May 21, 1944)).
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